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Social hierarchy exists in almost all social species and affects everything from resource
allocation to the development of intelligence. Previous studies showed that status within a
social hierarchy influences the perceived fairness of income allocation. However, the effect
of one’s social status on economic decisions is far from clear, as are the neural processes
underlying these decisions. In this study, we dynamically manipulated participants’ social
status and analyzed their behavior as recipients in the ultimatum game (UG), during which
event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Behavioral results showed that acceptance
rates for offers increased with the fairness level of offers. Importantly, participants were
less likely to accept unfair offers when they were endowed with high status than with
low status. In addition, cues indicating low status elicited a more positive P2 than cues
indicating high status in an earlier time window (170–240 ms), and cues indicating high
status elicited a more negative N400 than cues indicating low status in a later time
window (350–520 ms). During the actual reception of offers, the late positivity potential
(LPP, 400–700 ms) for unfair offers was more positive in the high status condition than in
the low status condition, suggesting a decreased arousal for unfair offers during low status.
These findings suggest a strong role of social status in modulating individual behavioral and
neural responses to fairness.
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INTRODUCTION
Fairness is an essential social norm in interpersonal interac-
tion (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). A wide variety of economic
games shows that people demand fairness in wealth allocation
and are often willing to sacrifice their own interest to pun-
ish behaviors that they feel are unfair (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Pedersen et al., 2013).
In one such game, the ultimatum game (UG), one player acts
as the proposer and is given a set amount of money to allo-
cate to the recipient who, in turn, can either accept the offer,
resulting in the allocation designated by the proposer, or reject
the offer, resulting in both parties coming away with nothing
(Güth et al., 1982). According to traditional economic theory,
people are motivated by self-interest, which means that pro-
posers should offer the lowest acceptable amount and recipi-
ents should accept any non-zero offer. Yet research shows that
proposers tend to split the pot evenly; recipients will reject
unfair offers, and the rejection rate increases as a function
of the level of unfairness. Such “irrational” decisions, some
researchers have argued, reflect norm-based preferences for equal-
ity (Camerer and Fehr, 2006) or personal reputation (Sanfey et al.,
2003).
Fairness considerations are influenced by a number of social
factors such as goodwill intention (Handgraaf et al., 2003;
Gürog˘lu et al., 2010), initial ownership (Wu et al., 2012), per-
sonal reputation (Charness et al., 2010), and social comparison
(Wu et al., 2011b). One other critical factor is the social status
of the individuals involved. Social status, or social rank, refers
to an individual’s relative position in terms of wealth, ability,
education, stature, or profession in a hierarchy (Adler et al., 2000;
Zink et al., 2008; Kraus et al., 2011b). As a highly pervasive
principle of social organization across almost all species (Chiao,
2010), social hierarchy affects the way we see ourselves and
others (Zink et al., 2008) and influences both physical health
(Sapolsky, 2005) and intellectual development (Bates et al., 2013).
Individuals in high standing often have preferential access to
resources vital to survival, including food, land, information,
power, and potential mating partners; they also have more power
or influence over individuals in lower standing, making infer-
ence of others’ status for such individuals extremely impor-
tant in social interactions (Chiao et al., 2004). Status can be
inferred from interpersonal features such as facial expression
(Chiao et al., 2008), body posture (Marsh et al., 2009), perfor-
mance hierarchy (Zink et al., 2008; Breton et al., 2014), and
from social signals including military symbols (Chiao et al.,
2009).
Of interest to the present study is that social status may
influence the way we engage in wealth allocation. It has been
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found that individuals in low social standing are more gener-
ous, charitable, trustworthy, and helpful than their high status
counterparts, who are more likely to break laws (e.g., fail to
break for a pedestrian while driving) and social norms (e.g.,
take candy from a child, report false scores to their advantage)
(Piff et al., 2010, 2012). Low status individuals also charge less
than high status individuals in bargaining situations (Ball et al.,
2001). In one study, Albrecht et al. (2013) used performance on
a quiz to establish participants’ social status and then instructed
them to judge how satisfied they would be if given certain offers
(ranging from disadvantageous unfair to advantageous unfair).
Individuals endowed with inferior social status were more sat-
isfied with disadvantageous payoff inequalities than their higher
status counterparts.
However, social status in these studies was assigned either ran-
domly or based on participants’ performance in a particular task.
Throughout each study, social status was fixed for a particular
participant and the comparison for the effect of social status on
social or economic decisions was between participants, limiting
the generalizability of the results. For instance, in all of the above-
mentioned studies, social status was either measured by objective
factors (i.e., socioeconomic status) or manipulated at one point
in time (priming, Piff et al., 2012; random assignment, Ball et al.,
2001; performance on a trivia quiz, Ball et al., 2001; Albrecht
et al., 2013), making it unclear whether the effects of social status
would change as social status changes. Additionally, Albrecht et al.
measured the effects of relative status (lower, same, higher status)
on potential satisfaction with a wide array of hypothetical offers.
However, this does not provide insight related to fairness percep-
tion of offers made in a real social interaction and eliminates the
potential for a graded examination of status on offer satisfaction.
Finally, these studies focused on the behavioral effects of social
hierarchy, without accounting for the neural substrates of these
effects.
In the current study, we used an interactive rank-inducing task
(i.e., time estimation task; see Boksem et al., 2012) to dynamically
manipulate participants’ social status over time and then asked
participants to act as recipients in UG. In the rank-inducing task, a
participant estimated the passing of 1 second together with 7 part-
ners (Figure 1A). Then he or she was given a rank (high, medium,
or low) according to his or her estimation accuracy relative to the
accuracy of the other players (Figure 1B). Following the ranking,
the participant played UG with one proposer randomly drawn
from the partners. During each UG trial, the participant was
first presented with a cue indicating his/her social status (high,
medium, or low) acquired in the previous rank-inducing task and
then presented with the UG offer ostensibly given by the proposer
(Figure 1C). The reason for presenting the social status cue was
twofold: first, this cue served to reinforce the effects of the rank-
inducing task throughout the UG trials; second, by measuring this
cue on every trial, we were able to measure the neural processing
of one’s own social status, independently of offers in UG. After
several rounds of UG, the participant entered the next block of
the rank-inducing task during which he or she would attain a new
rank before entering the next rounds of UG. The fairness of the
offer in UG was varied systematically over different rounds of the
game. We recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) time-locked
to the cue indicating participants’ social rank and to the offers
in UG. The empirical question was how the brain responded
to the social status cues and how social status modulated the
subsequent acceptance rate and neural responses to the offers
in UG.
Behaviorally, we focused on the acceptance rate of UG offers.
In line with previous studies, we expected that the acceptance
rate would decrease as the level of fairness in the division scheme
decreases. Importantly, we predicted that when participants occu-
pied low status, compared with occupying high status, they would
feel less entitled to fair offers and, as a result, be more likely to
accept unfair offers. This prediction is supported by studies show-
ing that low status individuals charge less than high status others
when bargaining (Ball et al., 2001) and are more satisfied with
unfair offers than when endowed with high status (Albrecht et al.,
2013). This “entitlement hypothesis” contrasts with an alternative
“emotion hypothesis”, which assumes that participants occupying
low status may have increased negative emotions towards unfair
offers and are therefore less likely to accept them as a result.
When facing threats from others, individuals experience stronger
negative emotions when they are in a low status position than in a
high status position (Kraus et al., 2011a). In fact, when given the
opportunity to express emotions in UG, acceptance rates increase,
suggesting that rejection of unfair offers may be an expression
of negative emotion (Xiao and Houser, 2005). Combined with
previous research showing that negative emotional states decrease
the likelihood of offer acceptance regardless of offer amounts in
UG (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007), one might predict that participants
in low status will accept less unfair offers than while in high
status.
At the neural level, we predicted that brain responses to the
cues indicating the status information should exhibit an atten-
tional effect with increased P2 or P3/LPP responses for the low
status when compared with the high status. This prediction is
tentative due to the lack of research on the neural temporal
processing of social status information. Despite this gap, there
is an abundance of potentially relevant research on the neu-
ral processing of emotions (Olofsson et al., 2008). Emotions
are relevant when it comes to social status because different
ranks lead to different levels of emotion (Zink et al., 2008).
We expected that, compared with the cue indicating high sta-
tus, the cue indicating low status would evoke more negative
emotions which would increase attention to the cue. Negative
emotional stimuli elicit an increased P2 when compared with
positive emotional stimuli (Carretié et al., 2004; Delplanque et al.,
2004); positive emotional stimuli also elicit an increased P3
or late positivity potential (LPP) when compared with neutral
stimuli (Bublatzky et al., 2014). In addition, given that the social
status cues were composed of the participant’s own face and
star ranking information (Figure 1C), these cues would also
be expected to invoke a self-evaluation process linking the cue
with self-related knowledge representations. Previous studies have
shown that, relative to unfamiliar faces, self faces or familiar
faces elicit a more negative N400 (Bentin and Deouell, 2000;
Eimer, 2000; Caharel et al., 2006; Butler et al., 2013). This N400
effect reflects the process of integrating one’s own face with self-
related representations in long-term memory (Guillem et al.,
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic diagram of the experiment. Each block in the
experiment consisted of two sessions: the status-inducing session and the
UG session. In the status-inducing session, the EEG participant completed 5
rounds of the time estimation task together with 7 other players by
attempting to press the space key exactly 1 s after the green square
disappeared (A), and then viewed status information based on his/her
estimation accuracy relative to others (B). The EEG participant’s photo was
highlighted with a yellow background. In UG session (C), the participant saw
the cues indicating his/her social status before the reception of UG offers. We
focused on the ERP responses time-locked to the screens with the asterisk.
2001; Caharel et al., 2006), possibly for the purpose of self-
enhancement (Brown et al., 1988). We may therefore predict
more negative N400 responses to one’s own face associated with
high status relative to the same face associated with low sta-
tus.
For the neural responses to the offers in UG, we predicted
that, compared with fair offers, unfair offers would elicit an
enhanced medial frontal negativity (MFN, or feedback-related
negativity, FRN) and a decreased P300. The MFN or FRN, which
is a negative deflection peaking between 200 ms and 350 ms
post-onset of feedback at frontocentral electrodes, has usually
been shown to be more enhanced for unfair offers than for
fair offers (Polezzi et al., 2008; Boksem and De Cremer, 2010;
Hewig et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012). It is suggested that the
MFN or FRN reflects an earlier, automatic detection of social
expectancy violation (Wu et al., 2011a). The P300, which is
the most positive peak in the period of 200–500 ms post-onset
of feedback at frontoparietal electrodes, has been found to be
smaller for unfair offers than for fair offers (Wu et al., 2011b; Qu
et al., 2013). It is suggested that the P300 reflects later, high-level
motivational/emotional processes (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). In
one study, unfair offers were also found to elicit a smaller LPP
than fair offers in a relatively late time window (450–650 ms) (Wu
et al., 2011b), which is perhaps not surprising given that LPP and
P300 are commonly assumed to originate from the same sources
(Hajcak et al., 2010). Critically, we were interested in how social
status modulates the response of the P300/LPP to offer fairness.
Although social factors, such as social comparison (Wu et al.,
2011b) and social exclusion (Qu et al., 2013), do not affect MFN,
they do affect the later ERP components. Thus, it is highly likely
that the social status would influence the P300/LPP effects on offer
fairness.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-two undergraduate and graduate students participated
in the experiment. Six of them were excluded for various rea-
sons (see the Result section). The remaining twenty-six partic-
ipants (12 females) aged between 18 and 25 years (mean age
22.3 years, SD = 2.1). All the participants were healthy, right-
handed, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No par-
ticipant had a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders.
Each participant was informed that the basic payment would
be around 80 Chinese yuan (about 13.5 USD) and additional
monetary reward would fluctuate based on performance in the
experiment (in actuality, all participants received 100 Chinese
yuan, about 16.5 USD). Informed consent was obtained from
each participant before the experiment. The experiment was in
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accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by
the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, Peking
University.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The experiment had a 2 × 3 within-participant factorial design,
with the first factor referring to social status (low vs. high)
and the second factor referring to offer fairness (unfair vs. sub-
fair vs. fair). As the focus of the study was on the difference
between high and low status, we set the medium status rank as
a filler condition. The UG offer was operationally defined unfair
if it was under 3 out of 10 yuan, sub-fair if it was between
3 and 4 out of 10 yuan, and fair if it was higher than 4 out
of 10 yuan. No offer was greater than 5 out of 10 yuan. We
defined a sub-fair level of offers because recipients require more
complex computations or strategies to decide whether to accept
or reject such offers than to respond to fair and unfair offers
(Polezzi et al., 2008). The social status information was conveyed
through a set of stars, with one filled star and two empty stars
indicating the low rank and three filled stars indicating the high
rank (two filled stars and one empty star indicated the middle
rank).
Upon arriving at the laboratory, the participant briefly met
a same-sex confederate and was told that the two of them were
going to act as recipients in UG in separate EEG rooms, which
would involve six same-sex strangers acting as proposers; the
six proposers would ostensibly arrive 1 h later because they did
not need to prepare for EEG recording. As such, the participant
did not meet the six proposers face to face and only viewed
pictures of their faces during the experiment. The reason for
such a setting was threefold: to form dynamic social hierarchies
across blocks, to avoid a reputation building effect in the ultimate
game, and to increase the interactivity and credibility of the
experiment.
The experiment consisted of two alternating tasks (Figure 1).
The first was a time estimation task (Boksem et al., 2012).
At the start of each time estimation task trial, the participant
viewed the facial photos (grayscale) of all eight players on
the screen, which indicated that the eight players were simul-
taneously performing the task. Then, a red square appeared
at the center of the screen as a warning signal and turned
green after 400–1150 ms. The green square disappeared after
400–1150 ms; the participants were instructed to press the space
key on the keyboard exactly 1 s after the offset of the green
square. They were told that their relative performance on the
task would determine their ranking. After completing 5 trials of
this task, all players were ranked and the participant received
the ranking information (which was experimentally manipu-
lated; Figure 1B). To avoid any confounding effect of social
comparison between the participant and the other recipient
(confederate), we only presented the ranking information of
the participant and that of the other six persons who would
act as proposers in the subsequent UG. The initial rank (high,
middle, and low) in the first block was counterbalanced across
participants.
The second task was UG. Each trial began with the presen-
tation of a fixation sign (a white cross subtended 0.3◦ of visual
angle) for 500 ms against a black background. The sentence
“The computer is selecting a partner for this round” in Chi-
nese (white and Song font, size 32) was presented for either
600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1100 ms, informing the EEG partic-
ipant that one of the other six proposers was randomly being
paired with the partner for the current trial. After the partner
was successfully chosen by the computer, the EEG participant’s
own picture (face only, grayscale, subtended 1.5◦ × 1.6◦) and
his/her own rank information (denoted by a set of stars, sub-
tended 2◦ × 0.8◦) were presented at the center of the screen for
1500 ms (Figure 1C). After the presentation of a blank screen
for a jittered time between 750 and 1250 ms, the proposer’s
division scheme (e.g., “Proposer: 8, You: 2”, white and Song font,
size 32) was shown at the center of screen for 1500 ms. After
the offer presentation, the two options, “accept” and “reject”,
appeared on the left and right side of the screen respectively,
with their positions randomly switched over trials. The EEG
participant was asked to make the “accept” or “reject” decision
by pressing the corresponding key as quickly as possible (using
the index fingers of the left and right hands). The next trial
began 1000 ms after the key press. Both the acceptance rate
and the response latency were recorded. The participant was
reminded that the proposers made their decisions individually
and independently, and his/her decisions would not be revealed
to the proposer.
Throughout the experiment, we recorded EEG data. We
focused our analysis on the cue indicating social status and the
offer in UG. It is important to note that the cue indicating status
was given on every trial during UG and only included the photo
and rank of the participant him/herself. We did not evaluate
ERPs on the collective game rank screen (Figure 1B) because this
ranking screen was only given once per block, resulting in too few
data points for reliable analysis.
The participant was seated comfortably about 1.5 m in front of
a computer screen in a dimly lit and electromagnetically shielded
room. The experiment was administered on a computer with
a VisuoSonic 22-in. CRT display, using Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral System Inc.) to control the presentation and
timing of stimuli. The experiment consisted of 12 blocks with
each block including 5 trials of time estimation task (result-
ing in one rank for the participant) and 30 trials of UG. The
participant was endowed with each of the two critical levels
of rank—high and low—for 4 blocks, with another 4 blocks
of middle rank as filler. To reduce the practice and fatigue
effect, the sequence of rank was Latin-squared across partici-
pants.
There were 10 trials for each of the offer levels (unfair: 1/9,
1.5/8.5, 2/8, 2.5/7.5; sub-fair 3/7, 3.2/6.8, 3.8/6.2, 4/6; fair: 4.2/5.8,
4.5/5.5, 4.8/5.2, 5/5) for each critical social status condition (high
vs. low). The number before the slash denoted the amount offered
to the recipient and the number after the slash denoted the
amount given to the proposer. Unknown to the participant, all the
offers were predetermined by a computer program and pseudo-
randomized with the restriction that no more than 3 consecutive
trials were of the same offer fairness.
Before the formal test, the participant performed 20 trials
of the time estimation task and 10 trials of UG to become
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familiar with the two tasks. After the experiment, the participant
was asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert Scale to what extent
he/she perceived his/her status as higher/lower (1 = much higher,
7 = much lower) than other players when he/she was in each status
condition. He/she was also asked to indicate his/her minimal
acceptable amount (out of 10 yuan) in UG, which was taken
as the measure of the perceived entitlement of the asset, and
fairness expectation within each social rank. In order to test the
effect of social status on emotions, participants reported on a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very strongly) the extent
to which they felt the intensity of negative and positive emotions
during each level of social status. The negative emotion included
the following dimensions: irritable, uneasy, nervous, uncom-
fortable, angry, and shameful, whereas the positive emotion
included the following dimensions: interested, energetic, proud,
inspired, determined, excited, happy, satisfied, and superior. The
participant was paid, debriefed, and thanked at the end of the
experiment.
EEG RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
EEGs were recorded from 64 scalp sites using tin electrodes
mounted in an elastic cap (Brain Products, Munich, Germany)
according to the international 10–20 system. The vertical elec-
trooculogram (VEOGs) was recorded supra-orbitally from the
right eye. The horizontal EOG (HEOG) was recorded from
electrodes placed at the outer cantus of left eye. All EEGs
and EOGs were referenced online to an external electrode,
which was placed on the tip of nose and were re-referenced
offline to the mean of the left and right mastoids. Electrode
impedance was kept below 5 kΩ for all the electrodes. The
bio-signals were amplified with a band pass from 0.016 to
100 Hz and digitized on-line with a sampling frequency of
500 Hz.
Separate EEG epochs of 1000 ms (with a 200-ms pre-stimulus
baseline) were extracted offline, time-locked to the onset of
each offer as well as to the onset of the screen in which the
participant’s portrait was presented with his/her rank informa-
tion in UG. Ocular artifacts were corrected by using indepen-
dent component analysis (ICA) approach. The EEG data were
filtered with a band-pass from 0.016 to 30 Hz. Epochs were
baseline-corrected by subtracting from each sample the aver-
age activity of that channel during the baseline period. All tri-
als in which EEG voltages exceeded a threshold of ± 80 µV
during recording were excluded from further analysis. For the
cue indicating social status, on average 90% (SD = 8%) of
the epochs after artifact rejection were entered into statistical
analysis; for UG offers, on average 94% (SD = 5%) of the
epochs after artifact rejection were entered into statistical anal-
ysis.
For statistical analysis, we divided electrodes into 9 regional
clusters based on two three-level factors: Hemisphere (left vs.
medial vs. right) and Region (anterior vs. central vs. posterior).
The left anterior cluster included F3, F5, FC3 and FC5; the
medial anterior cluster included F1, Fz, F2, FC1, FCz and FC2;
the right anterior cluster included F4, F6, FC4 and FC6; the
left central cluster included C3, C5, CP3 and CP5; the medial
central cluster included C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz and CP2; the right
central cluster included C4, C6, CP4 and CP6; the left posterior
cluster included P3, P5 and PO7; the medial posterior cluster
included P1, Pz, P2, PO3, POz and PO4; the right posterior
cluster included P4, P6 and PO8. Averaged amplitude over elec-
trodes in each regional cluster was used for statistical purposes.
Time windows were selected according to visual inspection of
the waveforms and preliminary analyses. For ERP responses
to different levels of rank, we focused on the P2 (the mean
amplitudes in the time window of 170–240 ms) and the N400
(the mean amplitudes in time window of 350–520 ms). Anal-
yses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted with three within-
participant factors: social status (high vs. low), hemisphere (left
vs. medial vs. right), and region (anterior vs. central vs. pos-
terior). For ERP responses to different offer levels, we focused
on the MFN (the mean amplitudes in the time window of
260–360 ms) and the LPP (the mean amplitudes in the time
window of 400–700 ms). ANOVAs were conducted with four
within-participant factors: social status (high vs. low), offer fair-
ness (unfair vs. sub-fair vs. fair), hemisphere (left vs. medial
vs. right), and region (anterior vs. central vs. posterior). The
Bonferroni correction was used for multiple comparisons and
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied for nonsphericity
when necessary.
RESULTS
Among the thirty-two EEG participants, three participants
claimed after the experiment that they disbelieved the setup
of the study, two participants accepted all offers regardless of
the fairness level, and one participant showed excessive arti-
facts in EEG recording. These participants were excluded from
data analysis, leaving twenty-six participants for the following
analysis.
MANIPULATION CHECKS OF SOCIAL STATUS
The post-experiment manipulation check for social status asked
participants how inferior/superior they felt in relation to the
other players after attaining one (three) stars in the time-
estimation game (1 = very inferior; 7 = very superior). Par-
ticipants’ responses suggested that the star ranking in the time
estimation task strongly influenced the perception of social status.
A one-factor (star ranking: three vs. one) repeated measures
ANOVA on the perceived status showed a significant main effect
of star ranking, F(1,25) = 147.90, p < 0.001, η2partial = 0.86.
When the participants obtained three stars in the time estima-
tion task, they perceived themselves as being in a higher status
(mean ± SE, 5.27 ± 0.16) than in the one-star, low status
condition (2.15± 0.16).
The manipulation of social status also affected the partici-
pants’ self-reported minimal acceptable amount in UG (out of
10 yuan). The minimum acceptable offer was significantly higher
when participants were in high status (3.73 ± 0.20) than in low
status (3.28 ± 0.19), F(1,25) = 5.57, p < 0.05, η2partial = 0.18.
Participants’ fairness expectations were higher in high rank
status (5.03 ± 0.14) than in low rank status (4.35 ± 0.17),
F(1,25) = 8.15, p < 0.01, η2partial = 0.25. These results suggest that
the perceived fairness in asset allocation was modulated by social
status.
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Finally, social status also affected participants’ experience of
emotions. We averaged scores on different dimensions to give
overall scores for the negative and positive emotions. ANOVA
showed that participants experienced more negative emotion in
low status (2.11 ± 0.12) than in high status (1.47 ± 0.08),
F(1,25) = 25.3, p < 0.001, η2partial = 0.50. Additionally, participants
experienced less positive emotion during low status (1.77± 0.10)
than during high status (3.87 ± 0.16), F(1,25) = 262.3, p < 0.001,
η2partial = 0.91.
BEHAVIOR RESULTS
We first averaged the response times for unfair, sub-fair, and fair
offers over each participant, and performed a one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA on the response time of the three types of
offers in UG. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of
offer fairness, F(2,50) = 21.52, p < 0.001, η2partial = 0.46, with
longer response times for the sub-fair offers (905 ms) than
for unfair (844 ms, p < 0.001) and fair offers (824 ms, p <
0.001). In line with Polezzi et al. (2008), our findings sug-
gest that sub-fair offers elicited a more complex computation
or strategy than fair and unfair offers. Therefore, predefining
each offer level in a smaller range and distinguishing sub-
fair offers from unfair offers can help us show clearer and
more precise behavioral and neural responses to each type of
offers.
We then performed a 2 (social status: high vs. low) × 3 (offer
fairness: unfair vs. sub-fair vs. fair) repeated-measures ANOVA
on participants’ acceptance rates for different offers in UG.
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of offer fairness,
F(2,50) = 107.74, p < 0.001, η2partial = 0.81, with the lowest accep-
tance rate for unfair offers (0.14± 0.05), intermediate for sub-fair
offers (0.61 ± 0.07), and highest for fair offers (0.95 ± 0.03). The
differences between conditions were all significant, ps < 0.001.
Importantly, the main effect of social status was also significant,
F(1,25) = 5.21, p < 0.05, η2partial = 0.17, indicating that the overall
acceptance rate was higher when the participants were endowed
with low status (0.59 ± 0.04) than high status (0.55 ± 0.04).
There was no significant interaction between social status and
offer fairness on acceptance rate F(2,50) < 1. Figure 2 shows the
acceptance rates for different offers.
P2 IN THE 170–240 MS TIME WINDOW ON THE CUE INDICATING
SOCIAL STATUS
We measured ERP responses to the presentation of cues which
denoted participants’ social status (Figure 3). In the time window
of 170–240 ms, a 2 (social status: high vs. low) × 3 (hemisphere:
left vs. medial vs. right) × 3 (region: anterior vs. central vs.
posterior) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of social status, F(1,25) = 8.38, p < 0.01, η2partial = 0.25, indi-
cating that ERP responses to the low status cue (3.23 ± 0.37 µV)
were more positive-going than ERP responses to the high status
cue (2.62 ± 0.33 µV), p < 0.01. The interaction between social
status and region was also significant, F(2,50) = 40.87, p < 0.001,
η2partial = 0.62. Testing for simple effects suggested that the P2 effect
appeared mostly in the anterior and central regions (ps < 0.01),
not in the posterior regions (ps> 0.1).
FIGURE 2 | The acceptance rate depicted as a function of offer fairness
and social status. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.
N400 IN THE 350–520 MS TIME WINDOW ON THE CUE INDICATING
SOCIAL STATUS
In the time window of 350–520 ms, the 2× 3× 3 ANOVA showed
a significant main effect of social status, F(1,25) = 5.11, p < 0.05,
η2partial = 0.17, indicating that the high status cue elicited a more
negative-going N400 (0.92 ± 0.26 µV) than the low status cue
(1.33 ± 0.23 µV). The interaction between social status and
region was also significant, F(2,50) = 6.34, p < 0.05, η2partial = 0.20.
Further analysis showed that the N400 effect was in the anterior
and central regions (ps < 0.05), not in the posterior regions
(ps> 0.1).
MFN IN THE 260–360 MS TIME WINDOW ON THE PRESENTATION OF UG
OFFERS
For ERPs locked with UG offers (Figure 4), in the time window
of 260–360 ms, a 2 (social status: high vs. low)× 3 (offer fairness:
unfair vs. sub-fair vs. fair) × 3 (hemisphere: left vs. medial vs.
right) × 3 (region: anterior vs. central vs. posterior) repeated
measures ANOVA showed that the main effects of social status
and offer fairness failed to reach significance, ps > 0.1. The
interaction between offer fairness and region was significant,
F(4,100) = 7.30, p< 0.001, η2partial = 0.23. However, further analysis
revealed no significant effects of offer fairness in any region
(ps> 0.1).
LPP IN THE 400–700 MS TIME WINDOW ON THE PRESENTATION OF UG
OFFERS
For ERPs locked with UG offers (Figure 4), in the time window
of 400–700 ms, a 2 (social status: high vs. low) × 3 (offer
fairness: unfair vs. sub-fair vs. fair) × 3 (hemisphere: left vs.
medial vs. right) × 3 (region: anterior vs. central vs. posterior)
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
offer fairness, F(2,50) = 18.49, p < 0.001, η2partial = 0.43, with
fair offers eliciting a stronger LPP (2.96 ± 0.42 µV) than unfair
offers (2.29 ± 0.40 µV), and unfair offers eliciting a stronger
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FIGURE 3 | ERP responses and topographic maps on the cues indicating
social status. (A) ERP responses time-locked to the onset of the social
status cue at the exemplar electrodes F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, and P4.
The mean amplitudes of the P2 were calculated within the 170–240 ms time
window. The mean amplitudes of the N400 were calculated within the
350–520 ms time window. (B) Topographic map for the P2 effect in the
170–240 ms time window, upper; topographic map for the N400 effect in the
350–520 ms time window, lower.
LPP (2.29 ± 0.40 µV) than sub-fair offers (1.66 ± 0.41 µV),
ps < 0.05. More importantly, the analysis also revealed a
marginally significant interaction between offer fairness and
social status, F(2,50) = 2.86, p = 0.067, η2partial = 0.10. Further
tests revealed that when participants were in high status, the LPP
responses were stronger for both fair offers (2.86 ± 0.51 µV)
and unfair offers (2.64 ± 0.46 µV) than for sub-fair offers
(1.66 ± 0.41 µV), ps < 0.005, with no difference between LPP
responses to fair and unfair offers, p > 0.1. However, when
participants were endowed with low status, the ERP responses
were stronger for fair offers (3.07 ± 0.39 µV) than for both
unfair (1.94 ± 0.38 µV) and sub-fair offers (1.66 ± 0.48 µV),
ps < 0.001, with no difference between responses to unfair
and sub-fair offers, p > 0.1. From a different perspective,
while social status did not affect the LPP response to fair
and to sub-fair offers, ps > 0.1, social status did have a
significant effect on unfair offers, F(1,25) = 7.68, p < 0.05,
η2partial = 0.24, with a stronger LPP for the high status con-
dition (2.64 ± 0.46 µV) than for the low status condition
(1.94± 0.38 µV), p< 0.05.
In addition, the interaction between offer fairness and
hemisphere was also significant, F(4,100) = 7.20, p < 0.001,
η2partial = 0.22. Tests for simple effects suggested that in
the left hemisphere, fair offers (2.71 ± 0.41 µV) elicited a
stronger LPP than unfair offers (1.94 ± 0.39 µV), p < 0.005,
and unfair offers (1.94 ± 0.39 µV) elicited a stronger
LPP than sub-fair offers (1.41 ± 0.39 µV), p = 0.07; in
the medial region, the aforementioned effect of offer fair-
ness remained the same, ps < 0.05. However, in the right
hemisphere, both fair (2.80 ± 0.35 µV) and unfair offers
(2.42 ± 0.35 µV) elicited a stronger LPP than sub-fair offers
(1.82 ± 0.34 µV), p < 0.001 and p < 0.005, respectively, with
no difference between LPPs elicited by unfair and fair offers,
p> 0.1.
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we used a modified version of UG to inves-
tigate whether and how social status influences recipient fairness
considerations. Behavioral results revealed that, consistent with
previous studies, participant acceptance rates for offers increased
with the fairness level of the offers. Moreover, participants were
more likely to accept offers when endowed with low status than
with high status. Electrophysiologically, the cue indicating low
status elicited a more positive P2 than did the cue indicating high
status in an earlier time window (170–240 ms); the cue indicating
high status elicited a more negative N400 than did the low status
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FIGURE 4 | ERP responses and topographic maps on the UG offers.
(A) ERP responses time-locked to the onset of the offer at the
exemplar electrode Cz. The shaded 400–700 ms time window
represents the area used for the calculation of LPP mean amplitudes.
(B) Topographic maps for the LPP effects in the 400–700 ms time
window.
cue in a later time window (350–520 ms). For the presentation
of UG offers, the LPP in the time window of 400–700 ms was
modulated by participants’ social status. Specifically, when the
participants were in high status, the LPP for fair and unfair offers
was more positive than for sub-fair offers; when the participants
were in low status, the LPP for fair offers was more positive than
for either sub-fair or unfair offers, which did not differ from each
other. Alternatively, while social status modulated LPP responses
to unfair offers, with a more positive LPP in the high status
than in the low status conditions, it did not modulate LPP to
fair and sub-fair offers. Taken together, these findings show that
social status can modulate behavioral and neural responses to
fairness.
During low status, participants accepted more offers. This
finding is consistent with the “entitlement hypothesis” instead
of the “emotion hypothesis”: for a given amount of offer,
participants were more likely to accept the offer when they
expected less than when they expected more. Results in the post-
experiment questionnaires showed that participants expected
lower offer amounts during low status than during high status,
which is consistent with this hypothesis. Although the partic-
ipants were explicitly instructed that their performance in the
time-estimation task had no relation with their final payoffs,
the perception of social rank and feelings of entitlement carried
over into UG, affecting acceptance rates of unfair and even
fair offers from anonymous others. The difference in the feel-
ing of entitlement for individuals in different levels of social
status may have arose from a difference in self-esteem. Previ-
ous studies showed that obtaining a low rank decreases indi-
viduals’ self-esteem (Ellemers et al., 1999) and sense of con-
trol over certain situations (Kraus et al., 2009). Compared with
individuals in low status, individuals in high status are more
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concerned with preserving self-esteem (Blader and Chen, 2012).
Unfair offers and even some fair offers in the current study
were perceived as challenges to one’s self-esteem and rejecting
such offers would serve to maintain social standing (Wu et al.,
2012).
Although the post-experiment questionnaires also indicated
that participants harbored more negative emotions toward unfair
offers when they were in low status than in high status, this dif-
ference seemed to have no influence on the acceptance rate of UG
offers. This finding is obviously inconsistent with other studies
showing an increased demand for fairness after negative emotion
priming (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007; Grecucci et al., 2013). It is
likely that, in the current study, the negative emotion associated
with low status was only a by-product and its effect on fairness
consideration was overridden by the effect of social status.
THE P2 AND N400 EFFECTS ON SOCIAL STATUS
The increased P2 amplitudes for cues indicating low status may
reflect an enhanced automatic attention to unpleasant stim-
uli (Carretié et al., 2001, 2004; Gerdes et al., 2013). The P2
is a positive deflection peaking around 200 ms post-onset of
the stimuli, and is involved in semantic processing (van Schie
et al., 2003), visual feature detection, and selective attention
(O’Donnell et al., 1997). Recent studies further suggested that
the P2 effect may reflect the evaluation of emotion valence
(Schapkin et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2013). For instance, larger
P2 amplitudes are found for unpleasant visual stimuli than for
pleasant or neutral stimuli, suggesting that the negative valence
of emotional stimuli can enhance the early attentional pro-
cessing of the stimuli (Delplanque et al., 2004; Olofsson and
Polich, 2007). In a study on stable and unstable social hier-
archies, Zink et al. (2008) found that decreases in social rank
led to increased activation in the insula and occipital/parietal
cortices, suggesting that a decrease in rank was not only a
negative experience, but that it increased participants’ percep-
tual and attentional processing. Taken as such, we interpret
the early increased response to low status information in the
current study as a salience marker for critical social informa-
tion.
The differentiation of low and high status was also present
in a later time window (350–550 ms), with a more negative-
going N400 for the cue indicating high status than for the cue
indicating low status. The enhanced N400 effect for the cue
indicating high status may reflect a stronger association between
the preexisting representation of the self and positive social
information. The N400 is a negative deflection peaking in the
period of 300–600 ms post-onset of the stimuli at centro-parietal
electrodes. In recent studies, this component was also found
to be associated with self-identification (Bentin and Deouell,
2000; Eimer, 2000; Caharel et al., 2006; Butler et al., 2013). For
instance, Butler et al. (2013) showed that the N400 amplitude
for self and dizygotic twin faces were more negative than for
unfamiliar faces. More importantly, when participants viewed self
and twin photos over a life span, the N400 only tracked age
changes in the self photos, suggesting the N400 as a unique neural
response associated with retrieval of stored mental representation
of the self in the self-identification process (Butler et al., 2013).
According to the theory of self-enhancement, participants are
more likely to attend to positive information related to the self
(Brown et al., 1988); in the current study, this theory would
suggest that participants would be more likely to form positive
self-representations by associating themselves more with cues
indicating high status than cues indicating low status. The more
negative going N400 for high status cues most likely reflects an
increased tendency to positively process information related to
the self.
THE LPP EFFECTS ON UG OFFERS
The current study showed a main effect of offer fairness on LPP,
with the mean amplitude of LPP being largest for fair offers,
intermediate for unfair offers, and smallest for sub-fair offers,
which is in line with previous studies (Wu et al., 2011a,b, 2012).
These findings may suggest that attentional resources were differ-
entially allocated to the three kinds of offers which had different
motivational/arousal significance. The LPP, similar to the P300,
is involved in social evaluation (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Leng
and Zhou, 2010), with increased positive amplitudes reflecting
enhanced motivated attention (Hajcak and Olvet, 2008; van Hooff
et al., 2011). For instance, the LPP has been reported to be larger
for both pleasant and unpleasant pictures than neutral pictures,
indicating that more attentional resources are allocated to stimuli
that are more motivationally relevant and arousing, irrespective
of the emotional valence of the stimuli (Schupp et al., 2003, 2004;
Hajcak and Olvet, 2008).
In the present setup, fair offers were linked with the largest
reward, sub-fair offers with immediate rewards, and unfair offers
with the lowest reward. Certain studies show that P300/LPP tracks
reward values, with an enhanced response to a larger reward
than a smaller reward (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Sato et al., 2005;
Leng and Zhou, 2010). If this were the case, in the current study,
the amplitude of the LPP should increase with the amount of
the offers in UG. On the contrary, we found that LPP ampli-
tudes were larger for both fair and unfair offers than for sub-
fair offers. This difference is most likely due to the fact that in
previous studies showing that P300/LPP is sensitive to reward
magnitude (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Leng and Zhou, 2010),
the monetary reward was presented as a single number to the
participant. Whereas, due to the interactive nature of UG in the
current study, the offers not only included the monetary reward
but also conveyed social information such as the fairness level
and proposer intention. Moreover, previous studies on fairness
show that unfair offers are threatening to one’s image of the
self (low value, high arousal), whereas fair offers are affirming
and abide by social norms (high value, high arousal) (Wu et al.,
2011a, 2012). These two kinds of offers are highly likely to
have equal or similar motivational/arousal levels and may lead
to enhanced motivated attention relative to sub-fair, less salient
offers. Therefore, we believe that the LPP effect is modulated by
the motivational relevance or arousal intensity corresponding to
different fairness levels of the offers, rather than by the reward
magnitude of the offers (Hajcak and Olvet, 2008; van Hooff et al.,
2011).
Importantly, we found an interaction between social status and
offer fairness on the LPP, with different patterns of effects for the
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high and low status conditions. In the high status condition, LPP
responses to fair and unfair offers were both more positive than
to sub-fair offers. The lack of difference between LPP responses
to fair and unfair offers can be explained from the motiva-
tional/arousal perspective outlined above. For individuals in high
status, unfair offers are particularly threatening to one’s self-
esteem (Wu et al., 2012) and hence are highly arousing, leading
to strong LPP responses. For individuals in low status, however,
unfair offers were more acceptable and less self-threatening, given
that they expected to receive lower offers (i.e., lower minimal
acceptable amounts) in this status, as evidenced by the increased
acceptance rates of unfair offers while in low status. Thus, the
arousal level of unfair offers is closer to the level of sub-fair offers
than to the level of fair offers. This explains why LPP was larger
for unfair offers in the high status condition than for unfair offers
in the low status condition. In addition, social status did not
modulate the LPP responses for the sub-fair or fair offers, which
may suggest that the motivational/arousal significance of these
two types of offers is not affected by social status information.
Two additional points are worth mentioning. First, in this
study we did not find an increased MFN for unfair offers over fair
offers, inconsistent with other studies using UG (Boksem and De
Cremer, 2010; Wu et al., 2011a, 2012; Qu et al., 2013). It is possible
that the complexity of the offer structure dampened the earlier
MFN responses to fairness. In the current study, participants
received twelve different offers (ranging from 1/9–5/5). The diver-
sity of offers was meant to create a more realistic scenario for the
participants in UG, but may have rendered the early, automatic
computation of fairness less straightforward and resulted in the
absence of the fairness effect on MFN. Nevertheless, the system
is sensitive to fairness in economic decisions, but in a later time
window with more advanced processing. Second, to more clearly
illustrate the relationship between social status and offer fairness,
we chose not to include the middle rank condition in our data
analysis. This was because in the current design the opponent’s
ranking was not given, making the middle rank susceptible to
social comparison (Wu et al., 2011b), which would complicate
the effect of status on fairness consideration. In addition, by only
analyzing the low and high status, our study took a different
position than past studies that have placed their central focus on
participants’ perception of higher and lower status others while
occupying the middle rank (Zink et al., 2008; Albrecht et al.,
2013).
To conclude, by dynamically manipulating the participants’
social rank, this study demonstrated that participants acting
as recipients in UG were more likely to accept unfair offers
when they acquired a low status compared with a high status.
Electrophysiologically, low status information elicited a larger
P2 than high status information in an early time window
(170–240 ms), while high status information elicited a more
negative-going N400 than low status information in a later
time window (350–550 ms). These findings suggest that the
perception of self-status information involves an earlier auto-
matic attentional processing of the emotional valence of the
corresponding social rank and a later working memory process
in which the stored representation of the self is retrieved to
facilitate self-identification. Additionally, both unfair and fair
offers elicited enhanced LPP responses (400–700 ms) when
compared with sub-fair offers. Moreover, the LPP was more
positive for unfair offers in the high status condition than in
the low status condition, suggesting decreased neural salience
of unfair offers while occupying a low status position. These
findings suggest that the brain responses to fairness in asset
division are modulated not only by offer fairness but also
by social status, providing further evidence for the context-
dependent nature of fairness consideration (Boksem et al.,
2012).
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